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  Summary: This paper highlights the role of financial development in producing innovative 
products and services. Venture Capitalists (VCs) seem to play a crucial role in achieving 
product and service innovation. Young entrepreneurs particularly face the problem of 
financial constraints if starting their business, and risk capital could be their sole solution. 
However, the level of early-stage venture capital (VC) investments across European countries 
differ profoundly. I employ a panel analysis to illustrate whether technical and innovative 
opportunities as well as entrepreneurial environment influence early-stage venture capital 
investments. In addition, I emphasize the role of the financial system in attracting early stage 
VC. The empirical analysis was conducted in 15 European countries and looked at the period 
from 1995 to 2005. The results show that technical and innovation opportunities as well as 
entrepreneurial environment influence the level of early-stage risk capital. Taking the 
financial system also into account, the analysis revealed that a bank-based system has a 
negative impact on the relative amount of early stage VC investments, as a market-based 
system attracts risk capital for young entrepreneurs. Assumedly, venture capital and debt 
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1.  Introduction 
From the 1990s until now, the most developed economies in Europe have significantly lower 
GDP growth rates than the US. These considerable lower growth rates go along with lower 
productivity growth and a poor development on the labour markets in the most European 
countries, especially in the large economies like Germany, France and Italy. One main 
challenge which faces the EU-15 economies is to be more innovative in terms of goods and 
services in order to counter the pressure of labour costs in EU-15 for unskilled labour 
triggered from the new EU member states and developing countries worldwide. Other than 
flexible institutions and less bureaucracy (see e.g. ALESINA et al, 2003, KLAPPER et al, 
2004), small- and medium-sized enterprises face one major hindrance to unlock their full 
innovative ability: access to capital. Improving SMEs’ access to finance is one of the key 
factors for more innovative business start-ups with high growth perspectives. Thus, the 
financial environment plays a crucial role in promote innovation.  
The Lisbon Programme notes that the limited availability of finance is an obstacle in 
setting up and developing businesses in Europe. A Eurobarometer poll published in 2005 
showed that many small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) find it increasingly difficult 
to obtain bank loans. In response to the question as to what would best assure the 
development of their company, fourteen percent of 3,047 interviewed SMEs in the EU-15 
stated easier access to means of financing.1 The results of the fourth community innovation 
survey (2004) support country specific surveys and shows that 23.6% of a sample of 70,623 
interviewed innovative firms in the EU-27 complain about innovation costs being much too 
high; thus this is an important factor of hampering innovation activities.2  
In the traditional perfect market approach to the analysis of financial markets, services are 
bought and sold in an anonymous manner, and the only information transfer consists of 
signals given by movements in prices. In this Arrow-Debreu world there is no need for 
financial intermediaries, as borrowers would obtain their loans directly from depositors. We 
have learned from MODIGLIANI/MILLER (1958) that in such a world, the financial 
structure of a firm does not matter. Nevertheless, one can find in the literature many reasons 
why the MODIGLIANI/MILLER theorem does not hold in the real world especially in 
financing innovations, e.g. STONEMAN (2001): 
•  The completeness of a capital market concerns issues relating to the diversity of 
capital instruments available. There could be a lack of such instruments, e.g. venture 
capital in underdeveloped financial markets, and affect the innovative entrepreneur or 
R&D investments of firms. 
•  A perfect market needs high numbers of participants on both the demand and the 
supply side. Even with offers on the supply side in certain areas, the financial services 
could have a monopolistic structure and thus avoid the development of a culture of 
innovative entrepreneurship.  
•  Financing innovative projects that have not yet been undertaken elsewhere, it may be 
particularly difficult to observe the systematic risk of similar projects in other firms 
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(GOODACRE/TONKS, 1995) and thus difficult to determine the appropriate discount 
rate. 
•  Moral hazard problem in R&D investment arises in the usual way: modern industrial 
firms normally have separation of ownership and management. This leads to a 
principal-agent problem when the goals of the two conflicts, which can result in 
investment strategies that do not share value maximizing (HALL, 2002). 
•  The asymmetric information problem refers to the fact that an inventor frequently has 
better information about the likelihood of success and the nature of the contemplated 
innovation project than potential investors. Therefore, the marketplace for financing 
the development of innovative ideas looks like the “lemon” market modelled by 
AKERLOF (HALL, 2002). 
•  Risk assessment on the stock market might be determined not by future, long term 
potentials of the firm, but rather by the psychologically determined peculiarities of the 
stock market (e.g., the stock market bubbles in Europe and US from 1998 to 2001). 
•  Financing decisions will be based upon after-tax costs and returns. The tax 
environment will thus have considerable influence upon the degree of investment and 
the means of financing investment. As tax regimes, especially in Europe, differ across 
countries, one may expect to find inter-country differences on preferred finance 
structures and financial instruments.  
•  For innovative projects, assets are highly specific and difficult to resell and thus 
bankruptcy costs are high. The difference between R&D investments and real capital 
goods are that the former has an essential higher rate of personnel costs (e.g., for 
R&D, construction, design, training and market launch). In Germany in 2004, only 
one-third of knowledge intensive goods and services fall upon real assets (KFW, 
2006). 
•  The knowledge one earns from research is often implicit and it is not possible to 
codify the new knowledge; moreover, if research staff leaves the firm the new 
knowledge is lost for the company.  
In this context one kind of financial intermediary has been well-established in the US and 
has successfully dealt with the problems of financing innovative projects: venture capitalists 
(VCs). VCs mediate risk capital normally from institutional investors like pension funds, 
insurance companies, banks, funds of funds, etc. Institutional investors manage large amounts 
of assets which are well-diversified. These investors then seek additional returns and are thus 
willing to allocate a small fraction of their capital in riskier investments. They use VCs 
normally specialized in one specific sector to screen the market for promising companies with 
extraordinary high growth opportunities. VCs bring supply and demand of risk capital 
together. The success of the VCs depends not only on their experience and ability to find 
adequate enterprises, but also on the economic environment as a whole.  
This paper examines factors which could influence the relative amount of early stage 
Venture Capital (VC) investments within Europe from a macroeconomic view. Early Stage 
VC means VC which is provided in the beginning of the business cycle the so-called seed (or 
pre-seed) and start up phase which is critical, as very often no final product exists. This 
investment stage is obviously risky but provides potentially high returns in the case of a 
successful firm development. The less risky later stage VC investments which encompass 
expansion and replacement investments could be more attractive for VCs. So the financing 
gap exists especially in the start up phase. The difference of the early stage VC investments 
relative to GDP between the European countries is tremendous. In addition to the already   5
existing analysis of GOMPERS/LERNER (1998), JENG/ WELLS (2000), SCHERTLER 
(2003), ROMAIN/VAN POTTELSBERGHE (2004) in terms of the level of (early stage) VC, 
I use for the most part other variables, in particular the inclusion of the financial system of 
each country is new. Aside from the technology capability, high skilled human capital stock, 
company tax rates, entrepreneurship, labor costs and growth opportunities, the panel data 
analysis of 15 European countries includes variables which indicate whether the financial 
system is more bank-based or market-based. The existing literature suggests that VC 
investments are affected by the financial system and could be one reason for different VC 
investment levels. A market-based system may be more suitable than a bank-based system for 
VC investments, since an IPO is the most profitable exit strategy.  
In the following section, I show some arguments why VCs are successful in establishing 
young firms. Section three provides arguments in the literature as to which financial system – 
a bank-or market-based system – may be more efficient in promoting innovative firms. This 
may be useful in two respects. On the one hand, the existence of financial intermediaries 
needs to be justified in economic terms, and on the other hand, the arguments made for both 
systems make clear why VC is especially efficient in fostering innovation or in other words 
market failure in financing innovations occur in both kind of financial system and so affects 
the demand and supply function of VC. I derive my main hypotheses that a market-based 
system fosters and a bank-based system rather prevents early-stage VC investment in the 
context of the arguments the literature is providing. However, the literature provides 
comprehensible arguments for both a bank- and a market based system to boost innovations, 
but a market-based system creates an environment which attracts early-stage VC as banks 
seem instead to be substitutes for VC due to their similar business model. The panel analysis 
in section four supports this view. Section five closes with some concluding remarks. 
 
2.  Venture Capital and Innovative Firms  
VC is primarily funding provided to young and typically innovative companies not quoted on 
the stock market, but it is provided in return for a share of equity in the company. The 
investors normally have a time horizon of 3 to 7 years, but sometimes as many as 10 years is 
allowed.3 Frequently VCs support the nascent entrepreneur not only with capital but also with 
advice and management expertise. VCs may sit on boards of directors to valuable governance 
and advisory support (ROMAIN/POTTESBERGHE, 2004). VC companies are typically 
specialized in very few or one industry sector. This specialization deepens technical 
knowledge and enables the VCs to select risky investments more efficiently. FENN et al. 
(1995) estimate that only one percent of all firms seeking capital obtain venture capital 
financing. GEBHARDT/SCHMIDT (2001) also conclude that VC promotes less than five 
percent of all potential projects. Even actual data of National-, European- and US Private 
Equity and VC Associations confirm this ratio. As a result of such a stringent selection 
process, KORTUM/LERNER (2000) find out for the US that increases in VC activity are 
associated with significant increases in patent rates. Moreover, they show that VC 
investments are three times more effective in generating industrial innovation than R&D 
expenditures. A very similar study for Europe by POPOV/ROSENBOOM (2009) discovers 
                                                 
3 Along DI MASI et al. (2003) e.g. the development process of biopharmaceuticals demands on average 12 years and 100 
million US $ R&D expenditures with only one out of 5000 initial drug canditates reaching market launch 
(EVANS/VARAIYA, 2003).   6
that the impact of €1 of private equity4 relative to €1 of industrial R&D expenditures is 2.6 
times more effective in terms of producing innovations measured by patents.  
HELLMANN/PURI (2000) discover that a start-up company financed by VCs needs less time 
to bring a product to the market. However, their survey contains 149 recently-formed firms in 
the Silicon Valley, and this local concentration should be taken into account before 
interpreting their results.  
BAUMOL (2002) argues that entrepreneurial activity may account for a significant part of 
the “unexplained” proportion of the historical growth output. Empirical evidence shows that 
VC-backed firms grow much faster at least in the beginning than non-VC-backed firms 
(ENGEL, 2002; ENGEL/KEILBACH, 2002). BERGER/UDELL (1998) and 
GOMPERS/LERNER (1999) emphasize that venture-backed firms outperform non-venture-
backed firms because of their willingness to conduct pre-investment screening and their 
special ability to monitor and assess value added.  
On further aspect is that the VCs does not make an investment all at once. Instead, capital 
is provided in stages, and the entrepreneur only receives enough funding to reach the next 
stage. An important theoretical prediction is that the objective of the first stage is to provide 
capital to a cash-constrained entrepreneur. After this first round, an agency relationship is 
established between the entrepreneur and the investor. Follow-up rounds are intended to 
mitigate the agency costs associated with this relationship. Objectives other than removing a 
cash constraint take precedence in follow up rounds. DAVILA/FOSTER/GUPTA (2003) 
deliver empirical results which go along with the theoretical prediction.  
If performance objectives are not met, the VCs must make a decision: should the firm’s 
strategy be reconsidered or must the management be changed (GORMAN/SAHLMAN, 
1989)? HELLMAN/PURI (1999) show that VCs replace the founder twice as often as non 
VC-backed firms. In the worst case, the venture capitalist stops his activity. Even if the 
venture capitalist decides to continue the project, he or she demands a greater participation on 
the part of the firm. So the venture capitalist has a powerful position. The venture capitalist 
usually receives convertible preferred stock. Like a debt contract, preferred stock requires the 
firm to make fixed payments to the shareholders whereas the promised payments must be 
made before any common shareholder gets dividend payments and impeded in that way that 
the entrepreneur is not paying himself high dividends (BERLIN 1998). When a venture 
capitalist holds the shares of a young firm, which means the shares are not marketable to other 
investors, the venture capital investor avoids the free-rider problem. The investor is able to 
earn profit from its monitoring activities and relieve the information costs of moral hazard 
(HUBBARD, 2008, p.240). VCs in the US are able to efficiently invest in young innovative 
firms due to their selection process, specialization, know-how and financial instruments. 
However, the early-stage market in Europe is very heterogeneous in terms of the (early-stage) 
investment levels and underdeveloped in the most countries in comparison to the US.  
Early Stage Venture Capital in Europe 
According to the OECD assessment lack of an equity investment culture, information 
problems, and market volatility especially from mid-2000 to 2003 hinder the development of 
                                                 
4 Private Equity includes beside VC also management buyins (MBI) and management buyouts (MBO). A management 
buyout (MBO) is a form of acquisition where a company's existing managers acquire a large part or all of the company and 
a MBI occurs when a manager or a management team from outside the company raises the necessary finance, buys it, and 
becomes the company's new management. In general MBIs and MBOs are financed by debt and occur in less risky and 
therefore often less innovative industry sectors which are characterized by relative stable cash flows.    7
early-stage financing in many European countries (OECD 2003). In spite of the existence of 
VC, the so-called seed (or pre-seed) and start up stage is critical. The less risky later stage VC 
investments which encompass expansion and replacement investments could be more 
attractive for VCs. The costly and time consuming phase for due diligence in seed and early-
stage deals often makes these investments less profitable compared to later stage VC 
investment deals that provide more attractive risk-return profiles (EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, 2005b). Therefore, the so-called business angels and early stage VCs play a 
crucial role to fill the capital gap in the seed stage.5  
European early stage venture capital represents only a small fraction of all private equity 
invested in Europe. The amount of Leverage Buyouts (LBOs) and Management Buyouts 
(MBOs) is ten times higher than in early stage venture capital.  
Figure 1. Stage Distribution of Investments in Europe 
in billion Euro 
 
Source: EVCA 
STOREY (1995) and MURRAY (1998) describe the difficulties in financing especially young 
high-tech firms as follows: 
•  It is difficult for outside investors to make reliable assessments of demand for the 
products/services in highly immature markets; 
•  The investments frequently encompass the research and developmental costs and high 
expenditure in the marketing phases;  
•  The authors also point out that the threat of accelerated redundancy in rapidly 
changing technology-based sectors remains; 
                                                 
5 Business angels are wealthy private persons with normally successful experience as an entrepreneur or a manager. They 
contribute their network of personal contacts in business and company finance circles. In addition to their experience, they 
also provide capital for young entrepreneurs with convincing business ideas. The European Business Angel Network 
(EBAN) reports that in the US, 250,000 angels invested $24 billion in 2005 in comparison to 75,000 angels who invested 
only €2-3 billion in Europe 
(http://www.eban.org/download/Standard%20EBAN%20Presentation_2007.ppt#287,18,Benchmarking angel activity)   8
•  The entrepreneurial recipients of the investors’ funds frequently lack the managerial 
experience and therefore the ability to exploit the advantages of the new technological 
innovation. 
Young and fast growing firms often need years to reach the break-even point. These firms 
have negative cash flow and need a developed venture capital market. A developed VC 
market means that there are enough independent VCs which are specialized in specific sectors 
and have built up both reputation and experience (the so called track record) to attract 
potential investors for high-risk investments.  
The next section devotes some attention to the role of the financial systems in fostering 
innovations. The following remarks should clarify why market failure in financing innovative 
firms occurs in both market- and bank-based financial systems. This market failure creates 
demand for risk capital in the high income countries I consider in the empirical analysis. One 
could argue that a market-based system creates a better risk/return ratio by means of the most 
lucrative exit strategy for VCs via IPO, but on the other hand, one could argue that bank-
based systems additionally influence the amount of early-stage VC investment negatively due 
their similar business model. Through the competitive situation between banks and VCs, the 
latter could be underdeveloped in terms of their relative size. In the end of the following 
section I derive my hypotheses as to which determinants may stimulate early stage VC 
investments in Europe and showing the empirical results in section 4. 
 
3.  Financial System, Venture Capital and Innovations 
Financial constraints have a large and significant impact on investments in innovative 
projects. SCHUMPETER (1911) was one of the first to discuss the importance of credit in the 
process of innovation. According to Schumpeter, the entrepreneur is the driving force behind 
the process of innovation, and he considers the lender’s assessment of the borrower to set the 
limit of credit expansion. In a further step, PAGANO (1993) employs a simple endogenous 
AK growth model to illustrate how financial development can influence growth through the 
enhanced accumulation of capital through higher savings (HICKS, 1969) and the improved 
ability of the financial sector to increase technological progress through the efficient selection, 
funding and monitoring of projects. On the one hand, larger volumes of financial funds saved 
promote growth as more savings are available to fund investment projects. This effect relates 
to the Hicksian view that better developed financial systems are those which channel higher 
quantities from savers to investors. On the other hand, an improved quality of intermediation 
can both enhance factor productivity and reduce the fraction of savings that are foregone due 
to suboptimal production plans of financial agents. Both effects resemble the Schumpetrian 
view, with better financial systems fostering capital by investing in more profitable projects 
(KOETTER/WEDOW, 2006). In this context, LEVINE (2004) and ANG (2007) deliver a 
useful summary about the functions and recent developments in the finance and growth 
literature. 
Debt financing of R&D projects could be difficult because of the above-mentioned 
characteristics of financing innovations. The Flash EB Report (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
2005a, p.25) seems to support this view. Answers to the claim that banks do not want to take 
risks in lending provide insight into the reasons why many SMEs are sceptical about access to 
financing through banks. 71% of SMEs totally agree or tend to agree with the statement that 
banks do not want to take risks in lending to companies and only 23% disagree with it.   9
There are some further problems which especially banks face. Due to fixed interest 
payments, banks do not participate in the high returns of successful outcome. They are 
therefore more concerned with the probability of failure when calculating the price of a loan. 
In this context, STIGLITZ/WEISS (1981) analyze why it could come to credit rationing 
instead of a higher interest rate which clears the market. The effects of moral hazard and 
adverse selection in debt markets explain why lenders may deny a loan agreement even if the 
project is profitable. Because of asymmetric distributed information about the risk 
characteristics and default probabilities of firm’s investment projects, lenders may ration 
credit rather than accept a higher interest rate to clear the market, because increases in the 
interest rate induce low-risk borrowers to exit the pool of applicants first. In addition, 
borrowers whose actions cannot be monitored by lenders have an intrinsic incentive to invest 
in risky, higher-return projects that increase the probability of bankruptcy. It is primarily for 
this moral hazard problem that equity rather than debt is considered the natural source of 
external finance for firms investing in risky R&D projects (KUKUK/STADLER, 2001).  
ALLEN (1993) argues that such a system which aggregates diverse views of many market 
participants is appropriate where are legitimate grounds for differences in views with respect 
to the investment decision. LEVINE (2001) and LEVINE/ZERVOS (1998) maintain that 
market-based systems create more suitable conditions in enhancing risk management, 
information dissemination, corporate control and capital allocation. Powerful banks use their 
close relationships to well established firms in order to prevent the entrance of newcomer. 
Hence, established firms are protected due to higher entrance barriers (HELLWIG, 1991). 
Dispersed shareholders can more credibly commit to not interfering in the running of firms 
than can dedicated owners. 
Despite this and the argument of credit rationing, one can also find arguments which 
emphasize the role of banks in financing innovative projects. STIGLITZ (1985) himself 
argues that well developed stock markets reveal information very quickly and they therefore 
reducing incentives for individual investors to invest in innovative projects. 
GERSCHENKRON (1963) and BOOT/GREENBAUM/THAKOR  (1993) argue in this 
context that banks could mitigate that problem by building up long-run relationships to firms. 
A further argument could be the ability of banks to realize economies of scales in monitoring 
firms (CARLIN/MEYER, 1999). STULZ (2000) claims that banks are more effective in 
financing innovative activities that require staged financing, because banks can credibly 
commit to making additional funding available as the project develops (BECK/LEVINE, 
2002). MAYERS/MAJULJ (1984) explained in their so called pecking order theory, why 
firms may be forced to issue new shares at a discount for financing R&D or be forced to self-
finance their R&D projects because of the adverse selection problems.  
Taking these arguments in account, firms often rely on internal funds as a consequence of 
imperfect capital markets. Empirical studies provide results demonstrating that R&D 
expenditures will be determined by available cash flow (e.g. HALL 1992; 
HIMMELBERG/PETERSEN, 1994; HARHOFF, 1998). However, the effect differs between 
countries (MULKEY/HALL/MAIRESSE, 2001). Empirically, results dedicated to young 
firms show that they are more financially constrained because they cannot use earlier profit 
accumulations for financing their R&D projects (MOORE, 1994; PETERSEN/RAJAN, 1995, 
BERGER/UDELL, 2002; CARPENTER/PETERSEN, 2002; CZARNITZKI, 2006). 
Moreover, older firms could benefit from their established relationships to banks and 
therefore reduce problems of asymmetric information. There are higher exit rates for young 
companies because of inexperienced management, problems of developing a costumer base   10
and problems of establishing the product in the market (MUELLER/ZIMMERMANN, 2006, 
p.4). LINK/BOZEMAN (1990) highlight the differences among small innovative companies 
with respect to different competition environments which could affect their financial decision. 
BOYD and SMITH (1998) do not argument in such a controversial way; banks and markets 
might act as complements in providing financial services.  
The aim of the VCs is to create value and to exit via buyout or initial public offering 
(IPO). The exit via IPO is to some extent the most profitable option for the investor and the 
entrepreneur. BLACK/GILSON (1997) stress this view. They highlight the role of stock 
markets and their complementary role as regards venture capital. This could be one 
determinant as to why the VC industry has more weight in the US than in Europe. The stock 
market for young, high-tech firms in the US is much better developed and enables many more 
IPOs than in Europe. This ensures much higher average returns on VC investments in the US 
than in Europe. On average a VC in the US yields returns of 26% p.a. for a ten-year 
investment to 31 December 2004 in comparison to 6.3% in Europe (EVCA, NVCA). In this 
context I enunciate my first hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: Market-based financial systems stimulate VC investments. 
AUDRETSCH/LEHMANN (2004) empirically analyzed whether debt and equity are 
complements or rather substitutes in financing young and high-tech firms. The results 
provided from AUDRETSCH/LEHMANN confirm the view of BLACK/GILSON. Using a 
data set of the firms listed on the Neuer Markt in Germany reveals that they suffer from lower 
performance as long as finance is restricted to traditional banks. They also point out the 
necessity for institutions such as the former Neuer Markt, because venture capital and debt 
provided by banks is found not to be complements but rather substitutes. I follow their 
approach and think that banks and VCs are rivals in terms of their business model. To find out 
whether these results hold for other European countries, I include the size of the banking 
sector of each country in the panel analysis and derive the second hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2: Bank-based systems prevent VC Investments as banks are to some extent 
substitutes. 
The third hypothesis considers other macroeconomic factors which may influence the 
level of early stage VC investments. VCs companies are interested in a strong demand for VC 
that means they are interested in a huge human capital stock of highly skilled people willing 
to start a business. The stock of knowledge depends i.a. on the educational system, the 
(international) networks of companies and R&D expenditures. VCs prefer also low company 
tax rates and labour costs which enhance their portfolio value. High GDP growth rate 
supports the demand for VC and may influence the survival rate of portfolio companies. All 
these factors are interrelated. The innovation system which METCALFE (1995) defines as a 
“… set of distinct institutions which jointly and individually contribute to the development 
and diffusion of new technologies and which provides the framework within which 
governments form and implement policies to influence the innovation process. As such it is a 
system of interconnected institutions to create, store and transfer the knowledge, skills and 
artefacts which define new technologies” clarify that the mentioned factors interact. For 
example the causality between finance and the genesis of innovation or growth is 
unambiguously.  
   11
 

















Hypothesis 3: The existing stock of later stage VC, qualified human capital, growth 
opportunities, entrepreneurship, interest rates, and technology capabilities positively 
influence early stage VC levels while the corporate tax rate and labor costs negatively 
affect early stage VC investments.  
The following section deepens some aspects concerning the third Hypothesis as I explain the 
used variables. 
 
4.  Empirical Analysis  
Empirical results from a macroeconomic perspective which explain determinants of VC via 
panel analysis are relatively scarce. JENG/WELLS, 2000; SCHERTLER, 2003; 
ROMAIN/POTTELSBERGHE, 2004 have done similar analysis, but for different countries, 
time periods and for the most part, different variables. Nevertheless, the following panel 
analysis follows their approach. 
Descriptive Statistics 
As mentioned above, early-stage VC capital investments raised from 1995 to 2005 in 
Europe differ profoundly across the European countries. In Denmark and Sweden, early-stage 
VC investments in 2005 amount to upwards of 0.051 and 0.052 percent of GDP, respectively; 
in Greece, early stage VC scarcely exits. I apply a GLS panel analysis to find out if the 
determinants formulated by the three hypotheses are responsible for such huge differences in 
the amount of early-stage risk capital in 15 European countries. The analysis includes the 
countries Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom from 1995 to 2005.   12
These countries have been selected because of their similar per capita income, available data 
and the fact that an analysis of this country sample has never been done before. In Eastern 
Europe, VC hardly plays a role in the observed time period. 
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The dependent variable is early-stage VC investments. The VC data are available at 
EUROSTAT.7 Hence, following their definition, early-stage means the sum of seed and start-
up risk capital. The variable is scaled by gross domestic product at market prices. 
The explanatory variables are proxies for the technological and growth opportunities, 
qualified human capital stock, macroeconomic and entrepreneurial environment as well as the 
financial system. Including the amount of VC investments in the later-stage (expansion and 
replacement capital) also makes sense considering the evolution of the VC markets. Evolution 
of a VC market means it seems logical to assume that in the beginning, VCs prefer to invest 
in less risky projects such as already-existing firms, which have a successful business model 
and need VC to assure growth opportunities. VCs need time to build expertise and 
confidence. Building a track record (e.g., building trust) is essential for convincing potential 
investors to commit money to a venture capitalist (SCHERTLER, 2002). Successful exits of 
portfolio firms build reputation, enable economies of scale and syndicate with other VCs, thus 
allowing the venture capitalist to invest in risky, early-stage investments. ZARUTSKIE 
                                                 
6 For a more detailed data definition see Appendix. 
7 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/web/table/description.jsp   13
(2006) determines that in seed stage VC funds, having a founding venture capitalist team with 
both venture investing experience and experience managing a start-up is the strongest 
predictor of fund performance. First-time seed stage funds with such founding teams strongly 
outperform their counterparts. An additional aspect is that in a more mature VC market as in 
the US, the VC portfolios are on average larger and provide better options for diversifying 
portfolios in early and later stage VC investments.  
The banking sector and stock market developments represent the financial system. Stock 
market development also affects the exit strategy and therefore the returns of VCs. To 
measure the weight of the banking sector, I follow the approach of LEVINE/ZERVOS 
(1996). The variable banking sector equals the value of loans made by banks to private 
enterprises divided by GDP. Specifically, I divided line 22d by 99b from the IMF´s 
International Financial Statistics. The market capitalization of listed companies (% of GDP) 
represents the size of the market-based system. Market capitalization (also known as market 
value) is the share price times the number of shares outstanding. Listed domestic companies 
are the domestically incorporated companies listed on the country's stock exchange(s) at the 
end of the year. Listed companies do not include investment companies, mutual funds, or 
other collective investment vehicles. I also include the stock turnover into the regression in 
order to measure the liquidity of the national stock markets. The turnover ratio is the total 
value of shares traded during the period divided by the average market capitalization for the 
period. Average market capitalization is calculated as the average of the end-of-period values 
for the current period and the previous period. 
(High-tech) patent applications, foreign direct investment inflows (FDI) and research and 
development (R&D) expenditures represent both technological ability and innovation 
activities. Patents reflect a country's inventive activity. Patents also show the country's 
capacity to exploit knowledge and translate it into potential economic gains. In this context, 
indicators based on patent statistics are widely used to assess the inventive performance of 
countries (EUROSTAT). I differentiate between patent applications and high-tech patent 
applications to the European Patent Office scaled by population assuming the later delivers 
better results to explain early stage VC investment, since VCs are interested in investing in 
fast growing high-tech sectors like information and communication technologies, 
biotechnology, and nanotechnology. R&D expenditures of the public and private sector 
represent the creation of new knowledge. In addition, I add FDI inflows which can 
permanently increase knowledge spillovers and the transfer and diffusion of technologies, 
ideas, management and organizational processes. In the regression, (high-tech) patent 
application, R&D expenditures and FDI represent the technological opportunities (TO) of 
each country. FDIs inflows represent also potential networks to foreign multi national 
enterprises and can be seen as an indirect measurement of labour market rigidities. 
New technologies are being developed and applied, in many cases very quickly. An 
increasingly skilled and effective workforce will be required if countries are to negotiate the 
rapid change and new challenges emerging in science and technology (S&T). Human 
resources in science and technology (HRST) signify the stock of human capital which fulfils 
one or other of the following conditions: successfully completed education at the third level in 
a S&T field of study; not formally qualified as above, but employed in a science and 
technology occupation where the above qualifications are normally required. The share of 
HRST of the whole work force may also be a proxy of potential entrepreneurs in high-tech 
sectors and therefore even a driver for the demand of VC.    14 






















Mean  0.028 0.076  19.953  97.094  4.66  1.688 73.125  0.882 
Median  0.019 0.055  11.891  86.68  2.15 1.72 61.793  0.831 
Maximum  0.107 0.351  124.435  271.93  92.67  4.250 271.11  1.730 
Minimum  0.000 0.000  0.05 1.40  14.73  0.433 12.688  0.306 
Std. Dev.  0.028 0.0654  25.675  75.996  9.645  0.903 46.442  0.345 
Sum  4.718 12.632  3292.36  16020.5  768.9  278.62  12065.63  145.554 
Sum Sq. Dev.  0.131 0.702  108112.5  947175.6  15258.5  133.94  353735.9  19.572 
Observations  165 165 165  165  165  165 165  165 
Cross sections 15 15 15  15  15  15 15  15 














Mean  3.053 33.136  5.759 55.47  0.577  34.91  18.938 
Median  3.032 34.00  5.055 37.57  0.596 35.15  14.10 
Maximum  11.681 53.20  17.270  257.94  0.705  49.77  46.10 
Minimum  -1.119 12.50  3.320  2.80  0.338 16.15  7.10 
Std. Dev.  1.911 5.839  2.311 48.92  0.081 8.830  10.809 
Sum  503.76 5467.54  950.39 9153.27  95.29  5760.4  3124.8 
Sum Sq. Dev.  599.28 5592.05  876.42  392575.8  1.098  12788.3 19162.33 
Observations  165 165  165 165  165 165  165 
Cross sections 15 15  15 15  15 15  15 
1 in % of GDP 
2 per million inhabitants 
3 in % 
4 value of loans made by banks to private enterprises/GDP 
5 quotient of total labour costs and real output 
6 % of active persons in the age class of 25-64 years 
7 % of total civilian employment   15
I use the self-employment rates as a percentage of total civilian employment to measure 
entrepreneurial activity or spirit. One has to handle this proxy with care since it contains all 
kinds of self-employment. Numerous entrepreneurs are not relevant for the demand of VC 
because of their less innovative business model. Moreover, becoming an entrepreneur can be 
triggered from the demand or the supply side of entrepreneurship. Being involved in 
entrepreneurial activity could be a necessity; there are simply no other options for earning a 
living, and there is no comparative assessment to be made. However, the countries in the 
panel analysis are high-income countries, and we can assume that the perception of people 
who start a business is opportunity-driven in the sense that they have the opportunity of an 
alternative occupation as an employee.  
The corporate tax rate negatively influences the value of the potential portfolio company 
as future gains have a higher discount rate and could affect the supply side of VC negatively. I 
also expect such a negative effect for the labour costs on early stage VC investments. Annual 
unit labour costs (ULCs) are calculated as the quotient of total labour costs and real output. 
An increase in interest rates should positively affect the demand from entrepreneurs for 
early-stage VC. Otherwise if the supply effect is higher – i.e., the VCs invest more when 
interest rates fall –, the coefficient should be negative. I use the logarithm of the interest rates 
of ten year government bonds and expect a positive sign as ROMAIN/POTTELSBERGHE 
(2004) already show in their analysis based on a panel data set of 16 OECD countries from 
1990 to 2000. I use the logarithm as I assume a non linear correlation of VC investments and 
interest rates. The expansion of an economy, measured as real GDP per capita growth, should 
affect the opportunities of firm growth and the survival rate of potential portfolio companies.  
Model 
Following the model of JENG/WELLS (2000) and ROMAIN/POTTELSBERGHE (2004), I 
create a supply and a demand function of early-stage venture capital. I assume the early stage 
venture capital supply (equation (1)) is driven by the level of later-stage VC investments, the 
corporate tax rate, the relatively size of the stock market capitalization and liquidity, labor 
costs, and banking sector as well as GDP growth. Equation (2) shows the demand function. I 
expect the later-stage VC, the corporate tax rates, technical opportunities, stock market 
developments, GDP growth, the stock of qualified human capital, entrepreneurial activity and 
the growth of interest rates influence the demand of early-stage VC. The variable technical 
opportunity is measured by FDI inflows, high-tech patent applications and all R&D 
expenditures.  
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To obtain (4), I solve the supply equation for the return percentage, and substitute this 
expression into the demand equation. The index i represents the country and t time; μi is a 
country specific unobserved fixed effect (see WOOLDRIDGE, 2002). One should expect 
positive signs for all γ, except for γ2, γ8, and γ9 in the case that the panel analysis is able to 
support the three hypotheses I have formulated. Before starting the regression analysis, I 
apply the panel-based unit root test of LEVIN/LIN/CHU (2002). As one can see (in table A.2 
in the Appendix) that the test fails to reject the presence of a unit root of the variables banking 
(sector) and labor costs, I modify the regression and take into account the first differences of 
the two relevant variables:  
Model 1: 
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It is also worth noting that d represents the first differences. In the second model presented in 
table 3, I include lags where it seems to be reasonable in an economic sense.8  
Model 2 (including lags for the variables R&D, high-tech patent application, self-employment 
and GDP growth):  
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Regression Results:  
The regressions results for models 1 and 2 are presented in table 2 and 3. All variables 
which are considered insignificant were taken out so as not to distort the R-squared or 
Durbin-Watson value. To estimate the regression, I use the pooled general least square 
method with country-specific fixed effects. Using a heteroksedasticity consistent covariance 
matrix estimator which provides correct estimates of the coefficient covariances in the 
presence of heteroskedasticity, derived from WHITE (1980), the tables accordingly present a 
weighted and unweighted estimation test result. The Durbin Watson test indicates no linear 
association between adjacent residuals from the regression models at the 5% level. Using the 
WHITE covariance estimator, there is not much of a difference. The weighted value of the 
particular model, 1.6 and 1.56, lies between the critical value from 1.60 to 1.86 for model 1 
and 1.56 to 1.90 for model 2 along the corresponding test statistic (see e.g. SAVIN/WHITE, 
1977, 1989-1996).9 Even the charts of the residuals for each country illustrate this fact (see 
appendix figure A.1 and A.2). Table 2 shows that two of the three proxies for the 
technological and innovation capacity, namely R&D expenditures and FDI inflows, are highly 
significant. In model 1 (without lags), the coefficient of high-tech patent applications is not 
significant, but in the model within which I have lagged this variable back to one year, the 
coefficient becomes highly significant. 
                                                 
8 It needs time before R&D expenditures as well as patent applications become marketable products. 
9 http://www.stanford.edu/~clint/bench/dw05b.htm   17
Table 2: Regression Results Model 1 
Dependent Variable: VC Early Stage Funds    
Method: Pooled EGLS (Cross-section weights)   
Sample (adjusted): 1996 2005     
Included observations: 10 after adjustments   
Cross-sections included: 15     
Total pool (balanced) observations: 150   
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (no d.f. correction) 
Variable  Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -0.082927 0.020864 -3.974549 0.0001 
VC Later Stage  0.159797 0.041449 3.855318 0.0002 
FDI 0.000780 0.000152 5.132427 0.0000 
Banking Sector  -0.036393 0.014346 -2.536744 0.0124 
Stockmarket 0.000154 7.30E-05 2.110038 0.0368 
Stockturnover 0.000167 6.48E-05 2.585072 0.0109 
Log Interests  0.022036 0.007028 3.135439 0.0021 
Corporate Tax Rate  -0.000640 0.000331 -1.934749 0.0553 
R&D Expenditure  0.036127 0.008657 4.173218 0.0001 
Laborcosts -0.235038 0.126356 -1.860122 0.0652 
Fixed Effects 
(Cross)        
Austria--C -0.000798      
Belgium--C 0.001936      
Germany--C 0.007772      
Denmark--C 0.001937      
Finland--C -0.045558      
France--C -0.009654      
Greece--C 0.056389      
Ireland--C 0.025554      
Italy--C 0.026525      
Netherlands--C -0.019440      
Norway--C 0.002405      
Portugal--C 0.046571      
Spain--C 0.008155      
Sweden--C -0.069562      
United Kingdom--C  -0.032232      
 Effects  Specification     
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)   
 Weighted  Statistics     
R-squared  0.654581      Mean dependent var  0.031804 
Adjusted R-squared  0.591529      S.D. dependent var  0.026261 
S.E. of regression  0.018740      Sum squared resid  0.044252 
F-statistic  10.38151      Durbin-Watson stat  1.606942 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000      
 Unweighted  Statistics    
R-squared  0.626970      Mean dependent var  0.031460 
Sum squared resid  0.047431      Durbin-Watson stat  1.679994   18
Table 3: Regression Results Model 2 (Including Lags)  
Dependent Variable: VC Early Stage Funds     
Method: Pooled EGLS (Cross-section weights)   
Sample (adjusted): 1996 2005     
Included observations: 10 after adjustments   
Cross-sections included: 15     
Total pool (balanced) observations: 150   
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (no d.f. correction) 
Variable  Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -0.094940 0.023758 -3.996156 0.0001 
VC Later Stage  0.162085 0.041398 3.915327 0.0001 
FDI 0.000722 0.000144 5.006242 0.0000 
Banking Sector  -0.026770 0.017309 -1.546565 0.1245 
Stockmarket 0.000146 6.62E-05 2.207790 0.0291 
Stockturnover 0.000130 5.73E-05 2.274124 0.0247 
Log Interests  0.016028 0.008666 1.849574 0.0668 
Corporate Tax Rate  -0.000695 0.000367 -1.895123 0.0604 
R&D Expenditure Lag 1  0.028856 0.009505 3.035867 0.0029 
Laborcosts -0.245794 0.124068 -1.981132 0.0498 
GDP Growth Lag 1  0.001645 0.001029 1.598240 0.1126 
High-Tech Patent Lag 1  0.000338 0.000147 2.302944 0.0230 
Selfemployment Lag 1  0.001516 0.000950 1.594540 0.1134 
Fixed Effects (Cross)         
Austria--C 0.009752      
Belgium--C 0.006204      
Germany--C 0.020098     
Denmark--C 0.015016     
Finland--C -0.054130     
France--C 0.005029      
Greece--C 0.017412      
Ireland--C 0.011505      
Italy--C 0.012205      
Netherlands--C -0.019748      
Norway--C 0.017632      
Portugal--C 0.030879      
Spain--C 0.004965      
Sweden--C -0.052551     
United Kingdom--C  -0.024267      
 Effects  Specification     
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)   
 Weighted  Statistics     
R-squared  0.686200      Mean dependent var  0.031951 
Adjusted R-squared  0.619869      S.D. dependent var  0.026743 
S.E. of regression  0.018362      Sum squared resid  0.041471 
F-statistic  10.34500      Durbin-Watson stat  1.556902 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000       
 Unweighted  Statistics    
R-squared  0.641180      Mean dependent var  0.031460 
Sum squared resid  0.045624      Durbin-Watson stat  1.595679   19
The stock market capitalization and the stock turnover as a sign for the liquidity of the 
stock market seem to be important determinants in explaining early stage VC investments 
since both are significant in both models between the 1% and 3% level. This result goes along 
with Hypothesis 1 and other already existing empirical results which show that vibrant stock 
markets are important due the higher chance of a lucrative exit strategy for VCs. However, the 
most important outcome is that the size of the banking sector could have a negative impact on 
early-stage risk capital investments. It appears that along the lines of 
AUDRETSCH/LEHMANN, the volume of credits to firms guaranteed from banks substitutes 
early-stage VC investments. This interesting empirical result supports the strand of financial 
literature which postulates that a market-based financial system is more appropriate to finance 
innovations if one believes that VCs are really more efficient in selecting and financing young 
and innovative entrepreneurs, because a market-based system creates an environment which 
attracts VCs. The negative coefficient which in model 1 is highly significant and in model 2 
of low significance, suggesting that banks to some extent replace VCs. A further reason could 
be that one can observe an increasing number of bank-dependent VCs in Europe. 
HIRSCH/WALZ (2006) and HELLMANN et al. (2008) observed that bank-dependent VCs 
invest in early investment stages less often.10 The panel analysis also supports the view that 
later-stage VC is a precondition for early-stage VC. The negative coefficients of the corporate 
tax rate and laborcosts indicate that the entrepreneurial environment counters. The lagged 
selfemployment rate boosts the demand for early-stage risk capital investments. As 
JENG/WELLS (1998) and ROMAIN/POTTELSBERGHE (2004) determined that GDP 
growth has a positive impact on early-stage investment, this analysis indicates this pro-
cyclical process with a time delay of one year as shown in the results of model 2. The R-
squared suggests that the independent variables might explain more than 65% of early stage 
VC. 
Human Resources in Science & Technology (HRST) as a Percentage of Active Persons in 
the Age Class of 25-64 Year is the sole variable which delivers no significant results in either 
model.  
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
In Europe young firms and firms with between 10 and 49 employees face specific challenges 
in obtaining capital for achieving their innovative ideas in marketable goods and services due 
to moral hazard, adverse selection and lack of collaterals. VC is appropriate to alleviate these 
problems. However, the difference between European countries in terms of early-stage VC in 
terms of the relative size is enormous.  
This paper is an attempt to analyze possible determinants that could influence the level of 
early-stage VC. The empirical results in this paper suggest that the technological capability, 
low corporate taxes and labor costs, growth opportunities, entrepreneurial activities, interest 
growth rates as well as later-stage capital enhance the activities of early-stage venture capital 
investments. It is worth noting that the financial system could also play a significant role in 
attracting early-stage VC. While it might be unsurprising that developed stock markets go 
along with high investment activities, the fact that the size of the banking sector has a 
                                                 
10 HELLMAN et al (2008) simply show that the probability is higher that independent VCs invest in early stage deals in 
comparison to bank dependent VCs. In absolute terms early stage VC deals or investments can increase with an increasing 
number of bank depending VCs.   20
significant negative impact is striking. The hypothesis that banks substitute VC due to their 
similar business models might be an explanation, but one must nevertheless be careful when 
interpreting these results. The analysis does not take into account which kind of firm receives 
capital. The applied variable banking sector does not differentiate between the size and 
innovation activities of companies. Moreover the industry structure remains unconsidered. 
Nevertheless the results suggest that goal of policy makers should be to support a single 
European stock market, which is appropriate for an investment exit via IPO to achieve higher 
investment returns for VC investments in Europe. A European stock market segment like the 
AIM in UK, where investors have essential tax benefits if they invest in companies traded on 
AIM, is achievable. One adequate instrument to spur early-stage investments which follows 
the same goal is to implement low tax rates for potential portfolio firms. This also enhances 
the value of the firm and makes it more attractive for venture capitalists to invest in Europe. 
This strategy seems to be more effective than a direct subsidy for innovative SMEs. A 
uniform tax regulation for Europe might enhance transparency, but it impedes competition for 
a best practise solution and does not account for country-specific conditions. The strategic 
objectives of the Lisbon Agenda (e.g., enhancing R&D expenditures) seems to be appropriate, 
even though the presented analysis is of course no cost-benefit analysis, and it remains 
unconsidered that the marginal costs could be higher than the marginal benefits. Moreover the 
considered variables interact and potential efficiency gains can be realized by an improved 
networking of the institution within the innovation system, e.g. between universities, 
Greenfield investments and VC companies. 
An interesting aspect in terms of stimulating early stage venture capital markets is to 
examine the role of government programmes or public depending VCs. Are publically funded 
VCs adequate at stimulating the VC market? If publically funded VC is required to develop 
VC markets, at which time would public help be useful and when could it become redundant? 
Depending on the composition of VC providers in different countries, one could expect 
varying risk profiles in investment behaviour and government structures to protect investors. 
In the case of Germany, BECKER/HELLMANN (2002) have analysed the clash of the WGF, 
the first German VC fund, determining that German norms on contracting and corporate 
governance provided insufficient investor protection, especially for the financing of early-
stage, high-risk ventures. More research may be done in this direction to learn more about 
VCs and their role in pushing innovations especially in Europe with heterogeneous conditions 
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Appendix 
Table A.1: Data Definitions and Sources 
Variable Description  Source 
Early Stage Venture 
Capital in % of GDP 
Later Stage Venture 
Capital in % of GDP 
Venture capital investment is defined as private equity 
raised for investment in companies; management 
buyouts, management buy-ins and venture purchase of 
quoted shares are excluded. Data are broken down into 
two investment stages: early stage (seed + start-up) and 
later Stage (expansion and replacement capital).  
The data are provided by the European Private Equity 
and Venture Capital Association (EVCA). The 
indicators are presented as a percentage of GDP (gross 
domestic product at market prices), which is defined in 
conformity with the European System of national and 





in % of GDP 
Research and experimental development (R&D) 
comprise creative work undertaken on a systematic 
basis in order to increase the stock of knowledge, 
including knowledge of man, culture and society, and 
the use of this stock of knowledge to devise new 
applications. R&D expenditures include all 
expenditures for R&D performed within the business 
enterprise sector (BERD) on the national territory 
during a given period, regardless of the source of funds. 
R&D expenditure in BERD is shown as a percentage of 




inflows in % of GDP 
FDI net inflows as a percentage of gross domestic 
product 
Foreign direct investment are the net inflows of 
investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 
percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise 
operating in an economy other than that of the investor. 
It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, 
other long-term capital, and short-term capital as 






Capitalization in % of 
GDP 
Market capitalization of listed companies (% of GDP) 
Market capitalization (also known as market value) is 
the share price times the number of shares outstanding. 
Listed domestic companies are the domestically 
incorporated companies listed on the country's stock 
exchanges at the end of the year. Listed companies do 
not include investment companies, mutual funds, or 




2007   29
Stock Turnover as a 
Percentage of the 
Average Market 
Capitalization 
Turnover ratio is the total value of shares traded 
during the period divided by the average market 
capitalization for the period. Average market 
capitalization is calculated as the average of the 
end-of-period values for the current period and the 
previous period. Source: Standard & Poor's, 
Emerging Stock Markets Factbook and 







To measure the weight of the banking sector I follow 
the approach of LEVINE/ZERVOS (1996). The 
variable banking sector equals the value of loans made 
by banks to private enterprises divided by GDP. 
Specifically, I divided line 22d by 99b from the IMF´s 







Corporate Tax Rate in 
% 
The basic combined central and sub-central (statutory) 
corporate income tax rate given by the adjusted central 





(gdpgrowth) in % 
GDP growth (annual %) 
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices 
based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based 
on constant 2000 U.S. dollars. GDP is the sum of gross 
value added by all resident producers in the economy 
plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not 
included in the value of the products. It is calculated 
without making deductions for depreciation of 







Applications to the 
EPO per Million 
Inhabitants 
The data refers to the ratio of patent applications made 
directly to the European Patent Office (EPO) or via the 
Patent Cooperation Treaty and designating the EPO 
(Euro-PCT), in the field of high-technology patents per 
million inhabitants of a country. The definition of high-
technology patents uses specific subclasses of the 
International Patent Classification (IPC) as defined in 
the trilateral statistical report of the EPO, JPO and 
USPTO.  
EUROSTAT 
Patent Application to 
the EPO per Million 
Inhabitants 
Patent applications to the EPO by priority year at the 
national level. 
When a patent was invented by several inventors from 
different countries, the respective contributions of each 
country is taken into account. This is done in order to 
eliminate multiple counting of such patents. For 
example, a patent co-invented by 1 French, 1 American 
and 2 German residents will be counted as ¼th of a 
patent for France, ¼th for the USA and ½ a patent for 
Germany. 
EUROSTAT   30
Human Resources in 
Science & Technology 
(HRST) as a 
Percentage of Active 
Persons in the Age 
Class of 25-64 Years 
Data examines the existing labour market stocks of 
HRST at national and regional levels. Unless otherwise 
stated, data is collected in line with the 
recommendations laid down in The Manual on the 
Measurement of Human Resources devoted to S&T 
(Canberra Manual) issued in 1995 by the OECD. 
HRST are people who fulfil one or other of the 
following conditions: 
•  Have successfully completed a tertiary level 
education or;  
•  are not formally qualified as above but employed in 
a S&T occupation where the above qualifications 
are normally required.  
The conditions of the above educational or 
occupational requirements are considered according to 
the internationally harmonised standards ISCED 
and ISCO. 
Eurostat does not include managers (ISCO 1) in the 
HRST population. 
EUROSTAT 
Annual Unit Labor 
Costs (Business Sector 
excl. Agriculture 
Annual unit labour costs (ULCs) are calculated as 
the quotient of total labour costs and real output. 
For more information on the OECD System of 
Unit Labour Cost, see http://stats.oecd.org/mei/ 
OECD Statistics 
Self-Employment 
Rates as a Percentage 
of Total Civilian 
Employment 
 
Self-employment jobs re those jobs where the 
remuneration is directly dependent upon the profits (or 
the potential for profits) derived from the goods or 
services produced (where own consumption is 
considered to be part of profits). The incumbents make 
the operational decisions affecting the enterprise, or 
delegates such decisions while retaining responsibility 
for the welfare of the enterprise.  







Interest Rates in %  Long term (in most cases 10 year) government bonds 
are the instrument whose yield is used as the 
representative ‘interest rate’ for each country. 
Generally the yield is calculated at the pre-tax level and 
before deductions for brokerage costs and commissions 
and is derived from the relationship between the 
present market value of the bond and that at maturity, 
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Table A.2: Common Pool Unit Root Test Results / LEVIN, LIN, CHU Method 
Sample: 1995 2005 
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
User-specified lags: 1 and Bartlett kernel     
Total (balanced) observations: 135     
Cross-sections included: 15     
Variable   Statistic  Probability*
Venture Capital Early Stage  -2.34291  0.0096 
Venture Capital Later Stage  -3.66284  0.0001 
Hight Tech Patent Application  -6.45178  0.0000 
Patent Application  5.10520  0.0000 
Foreign Direct Investment Inflows  3.27781  0.0005 
R&D Expenditures  3.74187  0.0001 
Stock Market Capitalization  5.47631  0.0000 
Stockturnover 3.53733  0.0002 
GDP Growth  3.06084  0.0011 
Corporate Tax Rate  -6.33028  0.0000 
Interests Rate  -10.2301  0.0000 
Banking Sector  1.64344  0.9499 
HRST -4.94271  0.0000 
Selfemployment 3.82449  0.0001 
Labor Costs  -1.12914  0.1294 
*Probabilities are computed assuming asymptotic normality 
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Table A.3: Common Pool Unit Root Test Results / LEVIN, LIN, CHU Method (1
st 
Differences) 
Sample: 1995 2005 
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
User-specified lags: 1 and Bartlett kernel     
Total (balanced) observations: 112     
Cross-sections included: 14     
Variable   Statistic  Probability*





















-4.59215   0.0000   
Stock Market Capitalization  -4.01439   0.0000   
Stockturnover  -3.52805   0.0002   
GDP Growth  -5.84061   0.0000   
Corporate Tax Rate  -5.34751   0.0000   
Interests Rate  -5.25741   0.0000   
Banking Sector  -3.67208   0.0001   
HRST  -10.8963   0.0000   
Selfemployment  -3.14969   0.0008   
Labor Costs  -5.36502   0.0000   
*Probabilities are computed assuming asymptotic normality 
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